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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FEDERAL PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN STATE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner was called to testify before a Louisiana grand jury
investigation of the alleged bribery of members of the New
Orleans Police Department. He refused to testify, asserting a
privilege against self-incrimination. The district attorney, pur-
suant to statutory authority,' granted petitioner immunity from
future state prosecution for crimes revealed by his testimony.
However, petitioner persisted in his refusal, relying on a claimed
federal privilege against self-incrimination. He sought to justify
his refusal by alleging that collaboration existed between federal
agents seeking evidence of income tax evasion and the state dis-
trict attorney, and that any testimony which he would give might
incriminate him under federal law. On the basis of stipulated
facts which admitted federal-state collaboration in the investiga-
tion,2 petitioner was convicted of contempt and the Louisiana
Supreme Court refused supervisory writs.3  On appeal to the
1. "Any person may be compelled to testify in any lawful proceeding against
anyone who may be charged with having committed the offense of bribery and
shall not be permitted to withhold his testimony upon the ground that it may
incriminate him or subject him to public infamy; but such testimony shall not
afterwards be used against him in any judicial proceedings, except for perjury in
giving such testimony." LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 13. This section is an exception
to the general privilege against self incrimination found in id. art. I, § 11. Other
statutes relating to compelled testimony in bribery cases are LA. R.S. 14:121 and
15:468 (1950).
2. The stipulation, in part, provided: "That there has existed, and now exists,
cooperation and collaboration between the District Attorney for the Parish of
Orleans and the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana and
the Internal Revenue Service of the United States of America and its investigators,
as well as with the Police Bureau of Investigation of the City of New Orleans
in reference to members of the New Orleans Police Department regarding public
bribery and income tax evasion." (Emphasis added.) Mills v. Louisiana, 360 U.S.
230, 232 (1959). It is to be noted that the defendant in the instant case was
not a member of the police force, therefore in view of the fact that bribery of city
police does not constitute a federal crime, the stipulation does not show any col-
laboration as to him. For further consideration of the effect of the stipulation,
see text accompanying notes 24-25 infra.
3. Record No. 74, p. 97. A detailed analysis of the district court decision and
the Louisiana Supreme Court's refusal to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction in
the instant case is outside the scope of this Note. However, it appears that the
decisions were correct as a matter of state law, since no other prosecution was
pending against Mills at the time. The instant case and State v. Ford, 233 La.
992, 99 So.2d 320 (1957) seem to make the availability of the privilege depend
on the proximity of the threatened prosecution of the witness in another jurisdic-
tion. The instant case is distinguishable on this basis from State v. Dominguez,
228 La. 284, 82 So.2d 12 (1955) and State ex rel. Doran v. Doran, 215 La. 151,
39 So.2d 894 (1949). For a discussion of the various state solutions to this prob-
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United States Supreme Court, held, per curiam, conviction af-
firmed. The one sentence opinion cited only the authority of
Knapp v. Schweitzer.4 Mr. Chief Justice Warren dissented on
the ground that the Knapp case left undecided the issues at bar,
and therefore he was of the opinion that it was insufficient au-
thority for the per curiam decision. 5 He-also expressed dissatis-
faction with decisions of the Court which seem to deny a recal-
citrant witness in a state proceeding the privilege against self-
incrimination but offer no protection against the use of evidence,
obtained as a result of the compelled testimony, against him in
a subsequent prosecution by federal authorities. Mr. Justice
Douglas dissented on the theory that a state court should be
compelled to protect the federal right against self-incrimination
where no federal protection is available to the witness." Mills v.
Louisiana, 360 U.S. 230 (1959), rehearing denied, 80 S. Ct. 40
(U.S. 1959).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
embodies the rule that no one shall be compelled to testify against
himself in a criminal proceeding. The courts have consistently
held that this provision is a restriction on only the federal gov-
ernment. 7  Efforts were made by Congress to circumvent
the Fifth Amendment's application in federal proceedings by
enacting statutes which purported to grant the witness im-
munity from future prosecution for crimes revealed by his testi-
mony.8 These efforts were based on the theory that if the wit-
ness were granted complete immunity from future prosecutions
the purpose of the privilege would be achieved and there would
be no reason for a refusal to testify. In Brown v. Walker,9 the
United States Supreme Court approved this reasoning and, after
finding the immunity granted broad enough to displace the privi-
lege, 10 affirmed a contempt conviction for refusal to testify.
In both the Brown case and the later case of Jack v. Kansas"
lem, see McNaughton, Self-Incrimination Under Foreign Law, 45 VA. L. REV. 1299
(1959).
4. 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
5. 360 U.S. 230, 231 (1959).
6. Id. at 238-39. Justices Douglas and Black concurred in the dissent written
by Chief Justice Warren; and Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black concurred
in the dissent written by Justice Douglas.
7. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
8. See, e.g., 27 STAT. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1958).
9. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
10. Four years earlier, in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), the
court found a similar statute invalid because it failed to provide complete protec-
tion for the witness. For a history of the development of immunity statutes, see
Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 549 (1957).
11. 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
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the concept of federalism presented a new problem. In Broum
the refusal was prompted by the fear of subsequent federal
immunity statute provided no protection from state prosecution
for state crimes revealed by testimony compelled in a federal
proceeding. The converse situation was presented in Jack where
the refusal was prompted by the fear of subsequent federal
prosecution based on testimony compelled in the state proceeding
under a state immunity statute. The Supreme Court in each case
held that the immunity statutes were valid and therefore the
privilege against self-incrimination was inapplicable. Both de-
cisions were based on the findings of the court that the danger
of future prosecution was too "remote" to be considered.'2 In
Ballmann v. Fagin,13 where the witness was being prosecuted by
the state at the time he was called to testify in a federal proceed-
ing, it was held that his testimony could not be compelled in the
federal hearing. This decision seems entirely consistent with the
Court's reliance on a "remoteness" test but it gave little warning
that the test soon would be discarded. Ten weeks later in the
case of Hale v. Hinkel14 the Court, without mentioning the
Ballman decision, apparently abandoned its reliance on the "re-
moteness" test and adopted the "dual sovereignty" theory in
self-incrimination cases. 15 Under the dual sovereignty theory,
designed for use where the sovereign threatening future prose-
cution is a completely separate entity from the interrogating
sovereign, the court need only look to the danger of future prose-
cution by the sovereign granting the immunity in deciding
whether that immunity is comprehensive enough to replace the
privilege against self-incrimination. The danger of subsequent
prosecution by any other sovereign need not be considered. In
United States v. Murdock' the application of the dual sovereign
doctrine was expressly reaffirmed. Mr. Justice Butler, for the
Court, said: "The principle established is that full and complete
immunity against prosecution by the government compelling the
12. In Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896), the majority stated: "But
even granting that there were still a bare possibility that by his disclosure he might
be subjected to the criminal laws of some other sovereignty, that ...is not a real
and probable danger . . . but 'a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial char-
acter, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so
improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct.' Such
dangers it was never the object of the provision to obviate."
13. 200 U.S. 186 (1906).
14. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
15. See Grant, Self-Incrimination in the Modern American Law, 5 TEMP. L.Q.
368, 399 (1931) and Grant, Immunity from Compul8ory Self-Incrimination in a
Federal System of Government, 9 TEMP. L.Q. 194, 195 (1935).
16. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
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witness to answer is equivalent to the protection furnished by
the rule against compulsory self-incrimination.' 1 7
It was inevitable that the application of the dual sovereignty
doctrine would present difficult problems where the two sov-
ereignties involved are as closely associated as the federal-state
sovereignties within the United States. One of the first such
problems involved the use in a subsequent federal prosecution
of testimony obtained by compulsion in a state proceeding. In
Feldman v. United States8 the Supreme Court held such evi-
dence to be admissible in the later trial. In Knapp v. Schweitzer,19
relied on by the Court in the instant case, the witness refused
to testify before a state grand jury. He persisted in his refusal
even after being granted state immunity and argued that a fed-
eral crime would be revealed by his testimony which, under the
Feldman rule, could be used against him. The conviction for
contempt was affirmed by a divided Court. Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting, voiced the growing concern over self-incrimination
decisions: "Indeed things have now reached the point ... where
a person can be whipsawed into incriminating himself under
both state and federal law even though there is a privilege against
self-incrimination in the Constitution of each .... I cannot agree
that we must accept this intolerable state of affairs as a neces-
sary part of our federal system of government.' '20
The majority in both the Feldman and Knapp cases seem to
recognize the danger inherent in the decisions. Collaboration
between federal and state officials could result in the state being
used as an "agent" to compel testimony while leaving the witness
powerless to prevent the evidence so obtained being used to his
detriment in a later federal prosecution.2 1 Although the Court
was not presented with the collaboration question in either case,
and specifically reserved the issue in Knapp,22 there is language
17. Id. at 149.
18. 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
19. 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
20. Id. at 385.
21. It seems apparent that the testimony given in the state proceeding would
be inadmissible in the federal trial. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28
(1927). However, the dissenting Justices in the instant case express concern over
the possibility that the compelled testimony may furnish the basis for a subsequent
federal prosecution.
22. "Whether, in a case of such collaboration between state and federal offi-
cers, the defendant could successfully assert his privilege in the state proceeding,
we need not now decide, for the record before us is barren of evidence that the




in both opinions which seemed to indicate that the witness would
be protected in such a situation.23
The Supreme Court's per curiam disposition of the instant
case creates doubt as to its exact meaning. The decision is sub-
ject to several interpretations. It is probable that the majority
did not find sufficient evidence of collaboration to remove the
case from the Knapp rule.2 4 The stipulated facts did not prove
collaboration by federal and state authorities against the defend-
ants in the instant case.25 However, both dissenting opinions
found that other circumstantial facts, when considered with the
stipulation, conclusively established such collaboration. If the
majority found no such proof, its reliance on the Knapp decision
as authority is unassailable. Another possible interpretation is
that the Court found collaboration. If this is correct, the Court's
reliance on the Knapp case is erroneous because the collaboration
question was specifically reserved by the Court in that decision.26
As a matter of speculation, assuming the majority of the Court
found sufficient evidence of collaboration, the decision could
mean either that it will attach no significance to such collabora-
tion or that the compelled testimony will be inadmissible in a
subsequent federal prosecution.27 The latter possibility furnishes
the basis for Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion. His
dissent was prompted by the fear that the witness will have no
protection against the use of evidence obtained as a result of
leads provided by the compelled testimony, even though the testi-
mony itself would be inadmissible in the subsequent federal
trial.2  Mr. Justice Douglas, obviously concerned with the lack
of protection afforded the federal privilege by the federal courts,
23. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote both decisions, said in the Feldman case:
"When a representative of the United States is a participant in the extortion of
evidence or its illicit acquisition, he is charged with exercising the authority of
the United States. Evidence so secured may be regained . . . and its admission,
after timely motion for its suppression, vitiates a conviction." 322 U.S. 487, 492
(1944). In the Knapp decision, he stated: "Of course the Federal Government
may not take advantage of . . . the State's autonomy in order to evade the Bill
of Rights. If a federal officer should be a party to the compulsion of testimony by
state agencies, the protection of the Fifth Amendment would come into play." 357
U.S. 371, 380 (1958).
24. Since the Knapp decision did not involve collaboration between federal and
state officials, the Supreme Court's reliance on that decision as controlling the
instant case would seem to support the inference that the majority failed to find
persuasive proof of collaboration.
25. See note 2 supra.
26. See note 22 supra.
27. Compare, e.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), holding that
when a federal agent is a participant in an illegal search, the evidence so obtained
is inadmissible in the federal courts.
28. See note 27 supra.
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seems to believe that the state courts should be required to fur-
nish the protection guaranteed the witness by the Fifth Amend-
ment.
Whichever interpretation of the Mills case is correct, it seems
clear that the satisfactory disposition of the problems required
more than a per curiam opinion. The result of the case, in the
light of the dissenting opinions and the silence of the majority,
has been to increase the uncertainty in this area. Some explana-
tion by the Court would have resulted in the assurance that wit-
nesses relying on their privilege against self-incrimination would
be able to make decisions based on settled law rather than ques-
tionable assumptions.
Jack Pierce Brook
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS
CLARIFIED WITH REGARD TO CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS
Petitioner was convicted of contempt of Congress1 for refus-
ing to answer questions of the House Un-American Activities
Committee relating to Communist methods of infiltration into
the field of education. 2 Petitioner was present when the subject
under inquiry was read by committee counsel. 3 He also heard
testimony of an earlier witness to the effect that petitioner had
been a member of a Communist club while a graduate student in
college. After answering several introductory questions relating
to his background, petitioner refused to answer five questions4
concerning his political associations, acquaintances, and member-
1. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1938) : "Every person who having been summoned as a
witness by the authority of either house of Congress to give testimony or to
produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint
committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of
Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, wilfully makes default,
or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question
under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of
not more than $1,000, nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for
not less than one month nor more than twelve months."
2. The printed report of this committee appears as: House Comm. on Un-
American Activities, "Communist Methoas of Infiltration (Education-Part 9)
H.R. Doc. 30172, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. 5754 (1954). (Hereinafter cited as 1954
Hearings).
3. "The field covered will be in the main communism in education and the
experiences and background in the party by Francis X. T. Crowley.
"It will deal with activities in Michigan, Boston, and in some small degree,
New York." 1954 Hearings 5754. See note 2, supra.
4. "Are you now a member of the Communist Party?
"Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?
1960]
